1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION 3 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) 5 VS) No. 3:14-cr-007-2 6 BRIAN MANOOKIAN 8 BEFORE THE HONORABLE TODD J. CAMPBELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 9 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 10 June 19, 2015 11 12 APPEARANCES: 13 For the Government: WILLIAM FRANCIS ABELY, II US Attorney's Office 110 Ninth Ave S., Suite A961 14 Nashville, TN 37203 15 For the Defendant: KIMBERLY S. HODDE 16 Hodde & Associates 17 40 Music Square East Nashville, TN 37203 18 19 2.0 2.1 TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM NOTES OF CATHY LEIGH, OCR: 22 Roxann Harkins, RPR, CRR 2.3 Official Court Reporter 801 Broadway, Suite A837 2.4 Nashville, TN 37203 615.403.8314 25

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(The following transcript has been prepared by Roxann Harkins, Official Court Reporter, to the best of her abilities from the steno notes of Cathy Leigh, Official Court Reporter, who passed away August 30, 2019.)

The above-styled cause came to be heard on June 19, 2015, before the Hon. Todd J. Campbell, District Judge, when the following proceedings were had, to-wit:

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THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're here in the case of *United States versus Brian Manookian*, and the purpose of this hearing is a sentencing. Previously the Court accepted the plea of guilty and approved the plea agreement and it is made in part under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) for a binding sentence. And some sentencing issues are still reserved for the Court.

I want to begin with Ms. Hodde to see if your client has read the presentence report and if there are any objections to it.

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MS. HODDE: Yes, Your Honor. He has reviewed the presentence report. We have reviewed it

together. There are no objections to the presentence report, except that Mr. Abley and I did catch an error in the presentence report that I included in my sentencing memorandum which related to a fine amount in this case.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. HODDE: And I don't know if that's truly an objection. It is really a correction to the presentence report. The statutory maximum fine in this case is a thousand dollars pursuant to the misdemeanor statute that Mr. Manookian pled to.

THE COURT: It sounds like an objection to me. I will give you both a chance to comment on that. But it appears that you are correct. It further appears that the plea agreement that was entered into in this case had the wrong fine amount. And I want to make sure that that does not change anyone's opinion about going forward or whether it is knowing and intelligent and voluntary.

So certainly that change is in favor of your client. But I want to make sure that you are not raising an issue about the plea itself.

MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor. I don't -- I believe Mr. Abley and I are on the same page. And I think if the Court were to look back, at the time of

the plea Mr. Abley provided the Court with an explanation of the elements of the offense. He provided correct statutory designation of a thousand dollar fine. It was an oversight on our part at the time of the plea drafting. It was something we should have caught that we didn't catch in drafting. It has not changed anything from my perspective, but I will certainly let Mr. Abley speak for himself.

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THE COURT: Okay. We're just about to hear from him. Mr. Abley.

MR. ABELY: Thank you, Your Honor. Well, there has been some confusion and changing positions about the maximum amount of the fine. I think it is largely academic but still worth clarifying.

Probation this week -- and I haven't had a chance to raise this with Ms. Hodde -- pointed out that under 18 U.S.C. 3571, which affixes the fine amounts, it would specify a maximum fine of a hundred thousand dollars for a Class A misdemeanor.

THE COURT: And that's what's in the presentence report.

MR. ABELY: And that's what's in the presentence report. I actually, upon further reflection, I think the presentence report is correct. Under 3571(e) it specifies that -- I read 3571(e) to

mean if another statute sets a different maximum fine and also expressly exempts the offense from the applicability of 3571, then that maximum holds.

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But as odd as it is, I believe that even though the statute to which Mr. Manookian has pled specifies a maximum fine of one thousand dollars, that Congress has basically said even though we said that there, we don't mean it. 3571 should carry the day. And it is all a little bit confusing. Again, I think it is academic here.

THE COURT: Well, it is not academic because I have to make a finding on it. And what are you to make of the general rule that specific controls the general for statutory construction?

MR. ABELY: Well, Your Honor, I think
3571(e) in stating — and this is in a general way.
Certainly doesn't apply to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act or any specific act. But it states that if a law
setting forth an offense specifies no fine or, as in
this case, a fine that is lower than the fine
otherwise applicable under this section and such law
by specific reference exempts the offense from the
applicability of the fine, I think there the
reference — I read the language by specific reference
to mean that the other statute has to somehow

acknowledge that 35 -- acknowledge the existence of 3571 and exhibit an intent to disregard it.

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I am actually — off the top of my head,
I am not aware of any such other statutes that set a
maximum fine specifically reference 3571. But in
terms of statutory construction, in terms of 3571(e)
and the principle to give purpose or meaning to all
parts of that subsection, I think that the two
requirements here, that it sets a fine that's lower
and that it by specific reference exempts it, I think
that second portion has to mean something.

THE COURT: Okay. I will hear from Ms. Hodde.

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$$ HODDE: Your Honor, may I take a look at the statute here that Mr. Abley was --

THE COURT: Yes. Take your time.

MS. HODDE: Your Honor, the way that I read this is is that this is a generic catch—all maximum fine for Class A misdemeanor of not more than a hundred thousand dollars. And it seems that logic would apply that obviously if the misdemeanor offense doesn't specify what the fine amount is, then you would default to this statute to determine what the potential maximum fine is.

But our statute does specifically provide

for a cap of not more than a thousand dollars or both. I mean, this is similar in the sense of those statutes that provide for the maximum penalties for A felonies, B felonies, et cetera, and then you take a look — if you don't specify what the penalty is but, for example, bank fraud is up to three years or tax fraud is up to five years or ten years or whatever the specific statute designates, if it didn't designate a penalty, then you would default to the felony statute to determine what the penalty is. I view this as is in the same vein as those statutes that are kind of a backup to the specific statute. That directs itself towards the conduct itself. I mean, I don't know what else —

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THE COURT: You are talking about maximum. This is talking about if the fine is lower than what's set out in 3571, so I didn't quite follow you.

MS. HODDE: But if the Court takes a look at 3571(b) fines for individuals --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HODDE: -- and this is a generic statute that applies based on the felony level or the misdemeanor level that we're looking at. If it is a felony up to \$200,000, if a misdemeanor up to not more

than a hundred thousand dollars. This is just a generic catch-all statute.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. HODDE: And my point is that we don't need the generic catch—all statute in this case because we have a specific declaration in the statute that applies to the offense to which Mr. Manookian pled, which is 21 U.S.C. — the penalty provision is 21 U.S.C. 333(a)(1), which says that for this particular violation of law you shall not be imprisoned for more than one year or fined not more than a thousand dollars or both. So it seems as though that would govern.

Now in subsection E, specific rules for lower fines specified in substantive provisions, I am not sure what this is supposed to mean by specific reference. If a law setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine that is lower than the fine otherwise applicable under this section — which is clearly what we have, a maximum fine that is lower on the applicable fine under this section — and such law by specific reference exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise applicable under this section, the defendant may not be fined more than the amount specified in the law setting forth the

1 offense. 2 I don't know how we -- I agree with the 3 Court. I mean, the general rule of statutory 4 construction is that the specific governs, not the 5 And this is clearly a general catch-all 6 I realize this is a specific provision under 7 the general catch-all statute, but it still -- it is 8 hard to reconcile that the specific statute to which 9 Mr. Manookian pled has a fine of not more than a 10 thousand dollars but the generic fine of up to a 11 hundred thousand dollars could possibly be applicable. 12 I mean, it just doesn't really reconcile. I know this 13 is not very helpful to the Court. 14 THE COURT: Which was passed in law 15 first? 16 MS. HODDE: Well, it looks like this 17 statute was passed in 1984 and then amended several 18 times as late as 1995. 19 THE COURT: What do you mean, this? 2.0 MS. HODDE: This the generic statute, 18 U.S.C. 3571. 2.1 22 THE COURT: Okay. 2.3 And the 21 U.S.C. 333 was MS. HODDE:

passed originally in 1970 and has been amended as

recently as January 1, 2015. So the specific was in

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     place before the general was in place.
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                   THE COURT: Are you talking about
     Section 331 or Section 333?
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                               21 U.S.C. 333.
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                  MS. HODDE:
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                   THE COURT: And it was last amended
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     when?
                               It looks like, based on what
                  MS. HODDE:
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     I have in front of me, it was last amended January 1,
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     2015.
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                  THE COURT:
                                That's what I have. Okay.
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                  MS. HODDE:
                               I would argue to the Court
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     that the specific penalty set forth in 18 U.S.C. 333
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     is the appropriate penalty in this case. It is up to
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     a thousand dollars. Now, as to --
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                                Well, it is complicated by
                   THE COURT:
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     the fact that the crime of conviction ended in 2009.
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     But we'll put an asterisk there.
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                  MS. HODDE: I don't think this particular
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     section was what was amended in 2015, it doesn't look
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     like, but I didn't also print out the full legislative
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     history on the statute. I didn't anticipate getting
     into this debate with the Court. My last discussion
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     with Mr. Abley was prior to his sentencing filing in
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     this case, which he agreed with me, that the statutory
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penalty was correct. So this is an evolution this

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THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Abley, anything else?

MR. ABELY: Your Honor, I would just add that I would tend to agree with Ms. Hodde. I don't know where exactly this leaves us that the Section 333 that sets out the \$1,000 fine is hard to reconcile with that general fine provision. Again, I assume the Congress must have meant something when they specified a maximum fine of \$1,000 in that statute. So I agree with her, it is difficult to reconcile the two.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I am finding that the maximum fine is a thousand dollars. It is precisely in the section that provides the penalties for Section 331. Section 333(a)(1) expressly states that the imprisonment must be for not more than one year or fine not more than a thousand dollars.

Section 3571 is in conflict with that. I think the specific controls the general. And if not, this is a classic case of not adequate notice of what the penalty is. Similar to Caligula putting the laws of ancient Rome on the top of buildings where nobody could read them, and this has the same effect.

So I am finding that it is a thousand

dollars in this case because the very statute that applies sets the fine amount. And it is more recently amended than the general statute.

Any objections?

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MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor.

MR. ABELY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to make some findings, then, for the record. Starting with the offense level computations, the record should reflect I am aware that the guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. Beginning with a base offense level of 6 for the pertinent guideline. There is a-cross reference and the cross-reference directs the guideline provision for fraud to be used, and that's also a base offense level of 6.

There is a 14-level enhancement because less than -- excuse me, more than \$400,000 but less than \$1 million was involved. And there is a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility for a total offense level of 17.

In terms of criminal history, there is Criminal History Category I. Mr. Manookian has no criminal history points.

In terms of the guidelines, the custody provision is controlled by statute. The maximum term

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of imprisonment is one year. If the guidelines apply,
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     it would be a greater amount, would be 24 to 30 months
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     but clearly the quideline provision becomes the
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     statutory provision because of the statutory maximum,
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     which is one year.
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                   Supervised release provision also --
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     since this is a misdemeanor, Class A misdemeanor, it
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     is a supervised release term of one year with the
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     quidelines.
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                   Probation under the guidelines is not an
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     eligibility because of the Zone D, but by statute
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     there is eligibility for up to five years.
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                   And the fine range we just talked about.
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     And I am making the finding this is statutorily
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     limited to $1,000. And there is a $25 special
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     assessment.
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                   Any objection regarding any of that?
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                   MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor.
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                   MR. ABELY: No, Your Honor.
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                   THE COURT: Mr. Abley, would you like to
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     introduce any proof?
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                   MR. ABELY:
                               No, Your Honor.
                   THE COURT:
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                               Ms. Hodde, would you like to
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     introduce any proof?
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                   MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor.
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Mr. Manookian that he has a right to address the Court if he wants to. If he does not want to, that's his right as well. In other words, it is his choice. He can be thinking about that and talking to his lawyer as I call upon the government to state its position regarding sentencing and then I'll turn to the defendant.

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MR. ABELY: Thank you, Your Honor.

The government recommends a sentence of a term of probation of one year with supervision to include a period of home confinement of nine months, and in addition a fine of \$1,000. And the statutorily required special assessment, which I understand Mr. Manookian has already paid.

THE COURT: Can I just ask you one interpretive question?

MR. ABELY: Of course.

THE COURT: The presentence report talks about positive monthly cash flow. But the total monthly cash flow is in parentheses, which normally means negative. I am looking at page 19, if it is helpful, paragraphs 78, the end of. On page 18 under total net worth it is a negative amount, I interpret it. So it seems like the presentence report is

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     internally inconsistent, and I just wanted to know
     what I missed.
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                   MR. ABELY:
                               And I am sorry, Your Honor, I
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     see the portion that shows the negative monthly cash
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            With what were you contrasting that?
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                   THE COURT:
                               Paragraph 80, based on the
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     defendant's positive monthly cash flow, it says.
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     is a quote.
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                   MR. ABELY:
                               I agree, Your Honor.
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     certainly seems, from the financial condition section,
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     that there is a negative monthly cash flow.
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                                Kind of like the two
                   THE COURT:
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     statutes.
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                   MR. ABELY: Yes.
                                     Something else in
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                Yes, Your Honor.
     conflict.
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                   THE COURT:
                                So the conundrum continues.
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     Thank you.
                  I just wanted to make sure I didn't
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     misread it.
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                   MR. ABELY: I don't believe so.
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     you.
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                   THE COURT:
                                Ms. Hodde, I realize that
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     the fine discussion is extending into time longer than
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     perhaps other things of importance to you, but I would
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     want you to address this as to how you reconcile, if
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you do, that the presentence report talks about

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positive monthly cash flow but expresses it in negative number.

MS. HODDE: He doesn't have a positive monthly cash flow, clearly. I mean, the negative number reflects a negative cash flow. I think if the Court were to take a look at the cash flow in the PSR, what the Court would see is that the cash flow is driven, to large extent, by something I am going to mention here in a second, which is this collateral civil litigation that he is involved in.

THE COURT: Nashville Armory?

MS. HODDE: Correct.

THE COURT: What is that? Is that a

nightclub?

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MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor. It is a gun range over off of I-65 in the Brentwood area. It is one of the -- I think it is the only five-star accredited gun range in Tennessee. Mr. Manookian is one of two partners in that business and they have been in ongoing litigation for years now.

Actually, they formed the business and then very shortly after forming the business they began litigation about what their partnership meant and how proceeds from that business were to be distributed. So they have been in litigation far

longer than they were ever happily in business together.

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cash flow. The fact that he is spending so much out-of-pocket to pay for civil attorneys fees in the Nashville Armory case. What I suspect probation meant by talking about prospective future income is Mr. Manookian has recently started a law practice that is gaining momentum. I think that you know he is hopeful that his cash flow situation is going to be positive. But also there is hope on the horizon that the Nashville Armory litigation will come to an end and that expense won't be there either. So without speaking for probation, what I suspect is that that is what they were trying to convey.

THE COURT: Well, I understood he was — his income came from something else than law practice. Maybe I misread this. It talked about his income having the potential of going up. And let me focus on that for a moment. In Footnote 5, the defendant reported that his salary is expected to significantly increase throughout the year due to anticipated increase in monthly earnings. And there was some other reference too. That was at least the second one.

MS. HODDE: That relates to his law practice.

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THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you this as for prospective law practice. This is a misdemeanor. And do you expect the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility will allow Mr. Manookian to continue practicing law or do you expect that to be in doubt?

MS. HODDE: I believe that they will continue to allow Mr. Manookian to practice law. This is not a crime of dishonesty to which Mr. Manookian has pled. It is a strict liability crime, if the Court were to do a — and I am looking at it from the Board of Professional Responsibility's — through their lens.

THE COURT: What I am looking at is whether he is going to have the ability to pay a fine. That's my interest.

MS. HODDE: I don't know how to answer that. Obviously the board will answer that over time. I mean, he has been in touch with the board. He is responsive to the board. He self-reported to the board.

I do not anticipate that the board is going to take his license, but I could be wrong about

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     that. I seriously doubt that I am wrong about that
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     given the fact that this is not a crime of dishonesty.
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     And the board obviously takes that very seriously.
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                   THE COURT:
                                I interrupted you.
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     sorry.
                  MS. HODDE:
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                               That's how I view this.
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     don't believe that they are going to take his license.
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     I believe he is going to be continuing to practice
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     law, given the fact that this is not a crime of
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     dishonesty.
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                   THE COURT:
                               Okay. Here the business is
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     described as Cummings Manookian, PLC. Is that the law
     firm?
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                  MS. HODDE:
                               It is.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now I am
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     straight on that. Okay.
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                  MS. HODDE: So, Your Honor --
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                   THE COURT: And I apologize for
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     misunderstanding the Nashville Armory. I have had
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     various incidents at Nashville Armory over the years.
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                               I may be vaquely familiar
                  MS. HODDE:
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     with some of the experiences you are referencing, but
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     I won't confess to that.
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                   THE COURT: One Armory allowed the
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     entire Vice Lord gang to hold a party.
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1 MS. HODDE: I remember that. I was in 2 that case, I believe. THE COURT: 3 That was an odd decision, 4 but that's only one of many Armorys that have come 5 this way. 6 MS. HODDE: Let's be clear that was not 7 the gun range. 8 THE COURT: I am not suggesting that was 9 the case here, but I just wanted to make sure that's 10 that I knew that's what it was. 11 MS. HODDE: It is not the same Nashville 12 Armory. That actually, so the Court is clear, is a 13 facility also out on I-65. 14 THE COURT: By Sidco Drive. 15 MS. HODDE: I think it is an ROTC owned 16 facility, military owned. 17 It is, which makes the THE COURT: 18 decision to rent it out to a violent gang even more 19 interesting. 2.0 MS. HODDE: It does. 2.1 Your Honor, on this case, though, this is 22 a case when Mr. Manookian was charged originally and, 2.3 of course, the superseding indictment also alleges the 2.4 same offenses, which I believe that Mr. Abley is going

to be dismissing today.

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He was charged with various violations of FDA regulations related to the sale and distribution of Melanotan II between 2007 and 2009 by the company Melanocorp, which Mr. Manookian was involved with along with his father, Ed Manookian, who was the company principal, and his sister, Karen Manookian, who was more of a hands-on daily worker in the business. And they also had an additional employee there who also was working selling Melanotan II within the States but primarily abroad.

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And this was a case that was indicted on the eve of the statute of limitations. Mr. Manookian, as the Court is well-aware, is a 33-year-old gentleman who is very well-educated, very well-spoken. He went to Vanderbilt Law School. He is a practicing attorney. He's admitted to practice in this court.

And he is somebody that, you know, has been through a lot in the last several years. He's had a couple of failed business ventures. The Nashville Armory is actually a wildly successful business, but he's had a terrible dispute with his business partner in that ongoing litigation.

He's been through additional litigation in the form of a divorce recently. The marriage didn't last long, but the divorce has lasted a very

long time, and that is finally in the books as well.

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And like I said, Mr. Manookian has been engaged in litigation for a very long time related to the Nashville Armory. Because of that civil litigation and the very aggressive and active misinterpretations of everything that has happened in this case by the civil litigants in the Nashville Armory case, every time something happens here it goes and gets kind of misreported. And as a criminal defense lawyer every time I see what happens in the Nashville Armory case I say to myself, these people don't understand federal criminal statutes. Essentially because of that kind of prolific misreporting of what happens in this case, I have advised Mr. Manookian not to allocute today for the sake of not having anything additional on the record today that would be then misreported. So he is going to decline, if he takes my advice, and not allocute today. THE COURT: Well, it is his choice. Τ don't have any expectation. Simply an opportunity if

he wants it.

MS. HODDE: The Court has already observed that Mr. Manookian has no criminal history points in this case. He is a Criminal History

Category I. He has no history of drug and alcohol abuse. He was raised in an excellent home with two loving parents.

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And the parties in this case, after sitting down and working very hard over an extended period of time, came up with what we believe was a very fair and accurate resolution of how this case should play out for Brian Manookian.

And that was to plead him to a misdemeanor offense that was a strict liability crime and one that is not a crime of dishonesty. And Mr. Abley and I are on the same page about that. We're more on the same page than we were 30 minutes ago on the fine issue, apparently, but we have discussed it. We both agree that it is a strict liability crime and it is not a crime of dishonesty.

That was something that we very carefully examined when we chose this particular offense to plead Mr. Manookian to. It is, of course, a misdemeanor offense as this Court is well aware. And I would ask the Court to impose a sentence that we have agreed to in the plea agreement.

I would ask the Court to impose a 12-month period of probation with nine months home detention as a special condition of probation without

electronic monitoring was our agreement. We have paid the \$25 statutory mandatory special assessment. We paid that today on the way into the courtroom. And, of course, he would have the statutory fine as the Court has held up to a thousand dollars.

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I certainly understand the Court's concern about imposing fines for somebody that appears in a PSR to have a negative cash flow. I know that is not something that the courts typically do when you show a negative cash flow. Unfortunately, I think that's going to have to be something the Court determines. We agree that the statutory fine is up to a thousand dollars. And I would ask the Court to impose a fine appropriately as the Court measures it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Abley, anything else?

MR. ABELY: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It is the duty of the Court to impose a sentence that's sufficient but not greater than necessary. In order to do that, I need to look at the Section 3553 factors. I am going to walk through those and then form an opinion and impose sentence.

The beginning point here is that Mr. Manookian has entered into an 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreement for probation of one year followed by nine months of home confinement not on electronic monitoring. And the Court accepted the plea of guilty and approved the plea agreement and I reaffirm that at this time.

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And in terms of what the parties are requesting, the parties are in agreement that the agreed sentence should be imposed. There is a little tension between them about what the fine should be, but that's a matter for determination for the Court and not part of the plea agreement.

The nature and circumstances of the offense. The crime of conviction is a misdemeanor. Count 7, which is introduction of an unapproved new drug in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 331(d) and that is the crime of conviction. As part of the plea agreement, Counts 1, 2 and 4 through 6 will be dismissed at the conclusion of this sentencing.

History and characteristics of the defendant. Mr. Manookian is approximately 33 years old. He is a well-educated man. He's got a JD degree from Vanderbilt. His father and sister are co-defendants in this case. And he is currently self-employed at Cummings Manookian, which is a law firm.

In terms of the seriousness of the offense, of course, all federal crimes are serious.

That's why federal courts exist. And having made that point, this is among the less serious of the offenses

I see. It is a misdemeanor offense. Not to detract from the criminal offense, but it is rare that there is a misdemeanor that I preside over.

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Respect for the law. Mr. Manookian has no criminal history points. He is in the fairly rare position of not graduating from the state court to federal court based on his criminal history points and he has zero.

Just punishment is really an aggregation of all of this.

Deterrence. There is specific deterrence and general deterrence. The agreed sentence is sufficient to accomplish the goal of specific deterrence. In terms of general deterrence, the troubling part about this case deals with the conduct of co-defendant in communications about essentially tying up the federal government in court.

More financially rewarding than ceasing business. And there is no indication that Mr. Manookian was part of those comments, and so I think there is specific. The general deterrence is

specifically taken into account in this agreed sentence.

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Protect the public. The Court is aware of the need to do that. This business is no longer operating.

Needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment, that doesn't apply.

Kinds of sentences available I have identified. The advisory guideline range I have identified. Policy statements, there is not anything that's particularly controlling.

Unwarranted sentencing disparities. That is an issue that the Court has considered, and I am aware of sentences generally having presided over 19 plus years of them and, of course, sentences that are imposed nationwide. And this is consistent with them and not unwarranted sentencing disparities.

And restitution is not an issue. So those are the factors that the Court is going to take into account.

And Mr. Manookian, I am going to impose the agreed sentence of one year of probation followed up to nine months — excuse me, followed by nine months, followed by nine months in home detention, and

that's the first nine months of the one-year term of probation. And there will be no electronic monitoring at this time. Of course, if there is subsequent violation, that would be reconsidered.

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And the following special conditions apply to the conditions of supervision in addition to the first nine months on home detention. You are prohibited from owning, carrying or possessing firearms, destructive devices or other dangerous weapons.

You have to furnish financial records to the probation office upon request.

You are barred from engaging in any occupation or profession in which you sell or distribute peptides or skin care products.

And you are ordered to pay a fine totaling \$1,000. I have considered your cash flow and income, and I am convinced that given your financial condition you can pay a \$1,000 fine. That is due immediately.

If for some reason you are not able to pay it immediately, then you do have to pay at least ten percent of your gross monthly income. No interest shall accrue on the fine as long as you are in compliance with any payment schedule dictated by the

Probation Office.

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Bear with me for one second. I want to discuss this so that we have clear guidance on it. The probation office recommended the condition of firearm restriction, and no party has objected to that. But the fact that the defendant is a part owner in the Nashville Armory, which is a gun facility, I wanted to see what the parties had by way of expectation of how that would be implemented so we make sure that there are no inadvertent mistakes.

MS. HODDE: Your Honor, we addressed that in the context of pretrial supervision, and what we came up with was we structured some language on the release conditions that addressed Mr. Manookian's business. I was also concerned about that prohibition on pretrial release given his business.

THE COURT: Here is why I am raising it.

I want to make sure that there is no what is

considered -- would be considered indirect possession

of firearms by almost a virtual ownership interest.

That's not what I intend.

MS. HODDE: I appreciate the Court clarifying that. I would also like to clarify one additional thing that this firearm prohibition is for the purpose of probation safety during supervision.

This is not something -- he is not a prohibited person --

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THE COURT: He is not a felon.

MS. HODDE: -- of 18 U.S.C. 922(q) or

those misdemeanor provisions that make you a prohibited person under that statute as well.

THE COURT: Well, just to be clear — and I want to hear from Mr. Abley. What I have in mind is Mr. Manookian physically possessing or indirectly controlling firearms at his direction rather than globally owning a business. Mr. Abley, what do you have in mind? I just want us to be clear so that if we get into a revocation proceeding, we're discussing it now rather than later.

MR. ABELY: I can understand that,
Your Honor, and I agree. And I agree with I think
what Ms. Hodde was alluding to regarding the purpose
of this special condition. And I think everybody in
the courtroom wants to craft this in a way that allows
Mr. Manookian to continue his ownership of the
Nashville Armory in such a way that it won't result in
a violation of his conditions.

Am I correct in interpreting Your Honor's recent comments as meaning that you want to revise the wording slightly of the condition you read out

earlier?

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everyone has a common understanding of this general provision that's virtually imposed in every case. We have — and, frankly, the standard conditions of the Court also deal with not possessing firearms. So it is really imposed in two ways. And what I am interpreting this to mean in this instance is that Mr. Manookian should not have personal possession of firearms. Or — well, I guess, that's what I really mean. Is that what you have in mind?

MR. ABELY: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Possession can be indirect, and that's the thing I want to clarify.

MR. ABELY: Certainly. I think we're in agreement that what this prohibits is personal possession. What this does not prohibit is his owning a corporate entity that may itself, separate and apart from the person of Mr. Manookian, possess a firearm.

THE COURT: Now that I am looking at the wording of this — and I apologize for rethinking it, but I am inclined to revise this to say the defendant is prohibited from personally carrying or possessing firearms, ammunition, destructive device or other dangerous weapons, deleting the word owning because

that could be prone to misinterpretation in this factual setting.

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MR. ABELY: I think that is more clear.
I agree.

THE COURT: Is that acceptable to the government? Ms. Hodde, I assume that's closer to what you had in mind.

MS. HODDE: It is. And I just want to be clear that this is for the period that he is on probation, for the one-year period of probation.

THE COURT: Correct. These are special conditions of supervision that apply for the one-year period of probation. And what I am trying to guard against is a misunderstanding that we end up in a revocation over unanticipated consequences, so it is just to have some clarity in this.

So I am going to restate this to be the defendant is prohibited from personally carrying or possessing firearms, ammunition, destructive devices or other dangerous weapons. Bear with me, change something else.

And I am going to change the standard condition of the Court to read the defendant shall not personally possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device or other dangerous weapon. So that that is

clear. And that's the condition that is imposed by default by statute, and so I am tailoring it to this particular case.

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So speaking of the standard conditions of the Court, I want to mention those as well, which is while on probation, Mr. Manookian cannot commit another federal, state or local crime. He cannot leave the judicial district without permission. He has to report as directed to the probation office. He has to be truthful in all answers to the inquiries of the probation office. He has to meet his family responsibilities. He has to work at a regular occupation unless excused. He has to notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change of residence or employment. He has to refrain from excessive use of alcohol and cannot use or possess any controlled substances.

Mr. Abley, do you want to state your position about whether this should be a drug testing condition?

MR. ABELY: Your Honor, I am not aware of any facts that would make such a condition appropriate. If I recall correctly, there was such a provision in pretrial release conditions, and Mr. Manookian has had no issues being on pretrial

release.

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THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Ms. Hodde.

MS. HODDE: Mr. Abley is correct. He has taken several drug screens while on pretrial supervision. Has always passed those, and I request

6 the Court not impose that as a condition of probation.

There is no indication that that is an issue at all.

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to waive the drug testing condition as part of the judgment. But impose the condition that the defendant refrain from excessive use of alcohol and cannot use or possess any unauthorized controlled substances or

illegal controlled substances. Cannot frequent places

where controlled substances are sold or used. Cannot

associate with persons engaged in criminal activity.

He has to permit the probation officer to visit him

and confiscate any contraband that's in plain view.

He has to notify the probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by law enforcement. He cannot act as an informer without Court permission. He has to notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by his criminal record.

risks that may be occasioned by his criminal record

23 As I indicated, I am waiving the drug testing

24 requirement.

And I have changed the standard firearm

condition to be that he cannot personally possess a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon. And he has to notify the U.S. Attorney's office within 30 days of any change of name or residence until all monetary sanctions are paid.

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As I indicated, there is a thousand dollar fine imposed. The \$25 special assessment is hereby imposed. And, of course, if he's paid it, he should get credit for it. Restitution is not an issue. Forfeiture is not an issue.

I need to advise Mr. Manookian of his right to appeal. I am going to hand him a notice of appeal form through the court officer. You have 14 days to file a notice of appeal. If you are unable to pay the cost of an appeal, you may appeal as a pauper. If you direct your lawyer to file a notice of appeal, your lawyer will. If you ask the clerk of court to file, the clerk will. Again, you have 14 days to file a notice of appeal.

This question is directed to the lawyers.

Do the parties have any objections to the sentence
just pronounced that have not been previously
raised? That's the question required by *United States*versus Bostic.

MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor.

1 MR. ABELY: No, Your Honor. And 2 Your Honor alluded to this earlier, but I did just want to formally move for dismissal of Counts 1, 2, 4, 3 4 5 and 6 of the superseding information. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Counts 1, 2, 4 6 through 6 are dismissed as part of the plea agreement 7 and on the motion of the government. 8 Anything else that we need to discuss 9 today? 10 MS. HODDE: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 11 MR. ABELY: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Judgment 13 will be entered as stated. Thank you. 14 (Which were all of the proceedings had in 15 the above-captioned cause on the above-captioned 16 date.) 17 18 19 2.0 2.1 22 2.3 2.4 25

1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE PAGE 3 I, Roxann Harkins, Official Court 4 Reporter for the United States District Court for the 5 Middle District of Tennessee, in Nashville, do hereby 6 certify: That I prepared this transcript 8 from the steno notes of Cathy Leigh, Official Court 9 Reporter, when the proceedings held in open court on 10 June 19, 2015, in the matter of UNITED STATES OF 11 AMERICA v. BRIAN MANOOKIAN , Case No. 3:14-cr-007-2 ; 12 and that the foregoing transcript is a true and 13 accurate transcript to the best of my abilities. 14 15 This is the 20th day of November, 2019. 16 17 s/ Roxann Harkins ROXANN HARKINS, RPR, CRR 18 Official Court Reporter 19 2.0 2.1 22 2.3 2.4 25